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Abstract 
 
 We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in two-players game with two 
strategic variables x  and p . We consider two patterns of game; one is the x -game in 
which strategic variables of players are x ’s, and the other is the p -game in which 
strategic variables of players are p ’s. We call two players Players A and B, and will show 
that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game, and the maximin 
strategy and the minimax strategy in the p -game are all equivalent for each player. 
However, the maximin strategy for Player A and that for Player B are not necessarily 
equivalent, and they are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in 
the x -game nor the p -game. But, in a special case, where the objective function of 
Player B is the opposite of the objective function of Player A, the maximin strategy for 
Player A and that for Player B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both 
in the x -game and the p -game. 
 
Keywords:  two-players game; two strategic variables; maximin strategy; minimax 
strategy  
  
JEL Classification:  C72; D43.  
 
1  Introduction 
 
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in two-players game with two 
strategic variables. We consider two patterns of game; the x -game in which strategic 
variables of players are x ’s, and the p -game in which strategic variables of players are 
p ’s. The maximin strategy for a player is its strategy which maximizes its objective 
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function that is minimized by a strategy of the other player. The minimax strategy for a 
player is a strategy of the other player which minimizes its objective function that is 
maximized by its strategy. We call two players Players A and B, and will show that the 
maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game, and the maximin strategy and 
the minimax strategy in the p -game for each player are all equivalent. However, the 
maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Player A and that for Player B are not 
necessarily equivalent (if the game is not symmetric), and they are not necessarily 
equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the x -game nor the p -game3. But in a 
special case, where the objective function of Player B is the opposite of the objective 
function of Player A, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Player A and that 
for Player B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the x -game 
and the p -game. Thus, in the special case the Nash equilibrium in the x -game and that in 
the p -game are equivalent. This special case corresponds to relative profit maximization 
by firms in duopoly with differentiated goods in which two strategic variables are the 
outputs and the prices. 
In Section 5 we consider a mixed game in which one of players chooses p  and the other 
player chooses x  as their strategic variables, and show that the maximin and the minimax 
strategies for each player in the mixed game are equivalent to those in the x -game and the 
p -game. 
 
2  The model 
 
There are two players, Players A and B. Their strategic variables are denoted by Ax  and 
Ap  for Player A, and Bx  and Bp  for Player B. They are related by the following 
functions.  
 = ( , ) and = ( , ).A A A B B B A Bp f x x p f x x  (1) 
They are continuous, differentiable and invertible. The inverses of them are written as  
 = ( , ), = ( , ).A A A B B B A Bx x p p x x p p  
 
Differentiating (1) with respect to Ap  given Bp  yields  
 = 1A A A B
A A B A
f dx f dx
x dp x dp
∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
 
and  
 = 0.B A B B
A A B A
f dx f dx
x dp x dp
∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
 
From them we get 
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 =
B
A B
A B A BA
A B B A
f
dx x
f f f fdp
x x x x
∂
∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (2) 
and  
 = .
B
B A
A B A BA
A B B A
f
dx x
f f f fdp
x x x x
∂
∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (3) 
Symmetrically,  
 =
A
B A
A B A BB
A B B A
f
dx x
f f f fdp
x x x x
∂
∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (4) 
and  
 = .
A
A B
A B A BB
A B B A
f
dx x
f f f fdp
x x x x
∂
∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (5) 
We assume  
 0, 0, 0, 0 and 0.A B A B A B A B
A B B A A B B A
f f f f f f f f
x x x x x x x x
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ − ≠
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (6) 
The objective functions of Players A and B are  
 ( , ) and ( , ).A A B B A Bx x x xπ π  
They are continuous and differentiable. We consider two patterns of game, the x -game 
and the p -game. In the x -game strategic variables of the Players are Ax  and Bx ; in the 
p-game their strategic variables are Ap  and Bp . We do not consider simple maximization 
of their objective functions. Instead we investigate maximin strategies and minimax 
strategies for the Players. 
 
3  Maximin and minimax strategies 
 
 
3.1  x-game 
 
3.1.1  Maximin strategy 
 
First consider the condition for minimization of Aπ  with respect to Bx . It is  
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 = 0.A
Bx
π∂
∂
 (7) 
Depending on the value of Ax  we get the value of Bx  which satisfies (7). Denote it by 
( )B Ax x . From (7)  
 
2
2
2
( ) = .
A
B A A B
AA
B
dx x x x
dx
x
π
π
∂
∂ ∂
−
∂
∂
 
We assume that it is not zero. The maximin strategy for Player A is its strategy which 
maximizes ( , ( ))A A B Ax x xπ . The condition for maximization of ( , ( ))A A B Ax x xπ  with 
respect to Ax  is  
 ( ) = 0.A A B A
A B A
dx x
x x dx
π π∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
 
By (7) it is reduced to  
 = 0.A
Ax
π∂
∂
 
Thus, the conditions for the maximin strategy for Player A are  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (8) 
 
3.1.2  Minimax strategy 
 
Consider the condition for maximization of Aπ  with respect to Ax . It is  
 = 0.A
Ax
π∂
∂
 (9) 
Depending on the value of Bx  we get the value of Ax  which satisfies (9). Denote it by 
( )A Bx x . From (9) we obtain  
 
2
2
2
( ) = .
A
A B B A
AB
A
dx x x x
dx
x
π
π
∂
∂ ∂
−
∂
∂
 
We assume that it is not zero. The minimax strategy for Player A is a strategy of Player B 
which minimizes ( ( ), )A A B Bx x xπ . The condition for minimization of ( ( ), )A A B Bx x xπ  with 
respect to Bx  is  
 ( ) = 0.A A B A
A B B
dx x
x dx x
π π∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
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By (9) it is reduced to  
 = 0.A
Bx
π∂
∂
 
Thus, the conditions for the minimax strategy for Player A are  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
They are the same as conditions in (8). Similarly, we can show that the conditions for the 
maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player B are  
 = 0 and = 0.B B
B Ax x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (10) 
 
3.2  p-game 
 
The objective functions of Players A and B in the p -game are written as follows.  
 ( ( , ), ( , )) and ( ( , ), ( , )).A A A B B A B B A A B B A Bx p p x p p x p p x p pπ π  
We can write them as  
 ( , ) and ( , )A A B B A Bp p p pπ π  
because ( ( , ), ( , ))A A A B B A Bx p p x p pπ  and ( ( , ), ( , ))B A A B B A Bx p p x p pπ  are functions of Ap  
and Bp . Interchanging Ax  and Bx  by Ap  and Bp  in the arguments in the previous 
subsection, we can show that the conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax 
strategy for Player A in the p -game are  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bp p
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (11) 
We can rewrite them as follows.  
 = 0 and = 0.A A A B A A A B
A A B A A B B B
dx dx dx dx
x dp x dp x dp x dp
π π π π∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
By (2), (3), (4) and (5), and the assumptions in (6), they are further rewritten as  
 = 0 and = 0.A B A B A A A A
A B B A A B B A
f f f f
x x x x x x x x
π π π π∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
Again by the assumptions in (6), we obtain  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
They are the same as conditions in (8). 
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player B in 
the p -game are  
 = 0 and = 0.B B
B Ap p
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
 They are rewritten as  
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 = 0 and = 0.B B B A B B B A
B B A B B A A A
dx dx dx dx
x dp x dp x dp x dp
π π π π∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
By (2), (3), (4) and (5), and the assumptions in (6), they are further rewritten as  
 = 0 and = 0.B A B A B B B B
B A A B B A A B
f f f f
x x x x x x x x
π π π π∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
Again by the assumptions in (6), we obtain  
 = 0 and = 0.B B
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
They are the same as conditions in (10). We have proved the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1   
1.  The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game, and the maximin 
strategy and the minimax strategy in the p -game for Player A are all equivalent.  
2.  The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game, and the maximin 
strategy and the minimax strategy in the p -game for Player B are all equivalent.  
 
4  Special case 
 
The results in the previous section do not imply that the maximin strategy (or the minimax 
strategy) for Player A and that for Player B are equivalent (if the game is not symmetric), 
and they are equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the x -game or the p -game. 
But in a special case the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Player A and that 
for Player B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the x -game 
and the p -game. 
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player A are  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (8) 
Those for Player B are  
 = 0 and = 0.B B
B Ax x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (10) 
(8) and (10) are not necessarily equivalent. The conditions for Nash equilibrium in the x
-game are  
 = 0 and = 0.A B
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (12) 
(8) and (12) are not necessarily equivalent. 
The conditions for Nash equilibrium in the p -game are  
 = 0 and = 0.A B
A Bp p
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (13) 
(11) and (13) are not necessarily equivalent. 
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However, in a special case those conditions are all equivalent. We assume  
 = 0, or = .A B B Aπ π π π+ −  (14) 
Then, (10) is rewritten as  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
B Ax x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (15) 
They are equivalent to (8). Therefore, the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for 
Player A and those for Player B are equivalent. = 0B
Ax
π∂
∂
 and = 0B
Bx
π∂
∂
 in (10) mean, 
respectively, minimization of Bπ  with respect to Ax  and maximization of Bπ  with 
respect to Bx . On the other hand, = 0A
Ax
π∂
∂
 and = 0A
Bx
π∂
∂
 in (8) and (15) mean, 
respectively, maximization of Aπ  with respect to Ax  and minimization of Aπ  with 
respect to Bx . 
In the special case (12) is rewritten as  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (16) 
(16) and (8) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategy (Player A’s strategy) and the 
minimax strategy (Player B’s strategy) for Player A constitute the Nash equilibrium of the 
x -game. = 0B
Bx
π∂
∂
 in (12) means maximization of Bπ  with respect to Bx . On the other 
hand, = 0A
Bx
π∂
∂
 in (16) means minimization of Aπ  with respect to Bx . 
(13) is rewritten as  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bp p
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (17) 
(17) and (11) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategy (Player A’s strategy) and the 
minimax strategy (Player B’s strategy) for Player A in the p -game constitute the Nash 
equilibrium of the p -game. Since the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for 
Player A in the x -game and those in the p -game are equivalent, the Nash equilibrium of 
the x -game and that of the p -game are equivalent. 
Summarizing the results, we get the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2 In the special case in which (14) is satisfied:   
1.  The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game and the p -game for 
Player A and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game and the p
-game for Player B are equivalent.  
2.  These maximin and minimax strategies constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the x
-game and the p -game.  
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This special case corresponds to relative profit maximization by firms in duopoly with 
differentiated goods in which two strategic variables are the outputs and the prices4. Let 
Aπ  and Bπ  be the absolute profits of Players A and B, and denote their relative profits by 
Aπ  and Bπ . Then,  
 = and = .A A B B B Aπ π π π π π− −  
From them we can see  
 = .B Aπ π−  
 
5  Mixed game 
 
We consider a case where Player A’s strategic variable is Ap , and that of Player B is Bx . 
Differentiating (1) with respect to Ap  given Bx  yields  
 = 1A A
A A
f dx
x dp
∂
∂
 
and  
 = .B A B
A A A
f dx dp
x dp dp
∂
∂
 
Differentiating (1) with respect to Bx  given Ap  yields  
 = 0A A A
A B B
f dx f
x dx x
∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
 
and  
 = .B A B B
A B B B
f dx f dp
x dx x dx
∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂
 
From them we obtain  
 1= , = ,
B
A B A
A AA A
A A
f
dx dp x
f fdp dp
x x
∂
∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
 
 = and = .
A A B B A
A BB A B A B
A AB B
A A
f f f f f
dx dpx x x x x
f fdx dx
x x
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
                                                      
4 About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition, please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato(2013),  Satoh and 
Tanaka (2013),  Satoh and Tanaka (2014a),  Satoh and Tanaka (2014b),  Tanaka (2013a),  Tanaka (2013b) and 
Vega-Redondo(1997). 
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We assume 0A
A
dx
dp
≠  and 0A
B
f
x
∂
≠
∂
, and so 0A
B
dx
dx
≠ . 
We write the objective functions of Players A and B as follows.  
 ( , ) = ( ( , ), ) and ( , ) = ( ( , ), ).A A B A A A B B B A B B A A B Bp x x p p x p x x p p xϕ π ϕ π  
Then,  
 
= ,
= ,
= ,
= .
A A A
A A A
A A A A
B A B B
B B A
A A A
B B A B
B A B B
dx
p x dp
dx
x x dx x
dx
p x dp
dx
x x dx x
ϕ π
ϕ π π
ϕ π
ϕ π π
∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂

∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂
 ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ +
 ∂ ∂ ∂
 (18) 
By similar ways to the arguments in Section 3, we can show that the conditions for the 
maximin strategy and the conditions for the minimax strategy for Player A are equivalent, 
and they are  
 = 0 and = 0.A A
A Bp x
ϕ ϕ∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (19) 
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player B are  
 = 0 and = 0.B B
A Bp x
ϕ ϕ∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (20) 
By (18), (19) is rewritten as  
 = 0 and = 0.A A A A A
A A A B B
dx dx
x dp x dx x
π π π∂ ∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Similarly, (20) is rewritten as follows.  
 = 0 and = 0.B A B A B
A A A B B
dx dx
x dp x dx x
π π π∂ ∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂ ∂
 
By the assumptions 0A
A
dx
dp
≠  and 0A
B
dx
dx
≠ , then we obtain  
 = 0 and = 0,A A
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
and  
 = 0 and = 0.B B
A Bx x
π π∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
They are the same as the conditions for the maximin and minimax strategies for Players A 
and B in the x -game. We have shown the following result.  
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Proposition 3 The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for each player in the mixed 
game are equivalent to those in the x -game and the p -game.  
 
6  Concluding Remark 
 
We have analyzed maximin and minimax strategies in two-players game with two 
strategic variables. We assumed differentiability of objective functions of players. In the 
future research we want to extend the arguments of this paper to a case where objective 
functions of players are not assumed to be differentiable5 and to a case of symmetric game 
with more than two players. In an asymmetric multi-person game with two strategic 
variables the equivalence results of this paper do not hold. 
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